Looking for:
Winning ugly download pdf
Read online free Winning Ugly ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
In the new introduction to this third edition, Gilbert uses his inside access to analyze current stars such as Serena Williams and Rafael Nadal, showing readers how to beat better players without playing better tennis. Written with clarity and wit, this classic combat manual for the tennis court has become the bible of tennis instruction books for countless players worldwide. Advice from a pro on how to improve your tennis game lists the six reasons never to serve first and covers psychological aspects of the game.
He’s been called the best in the world at the mental game of tennis. Brad Gilbert’s strokes may not be pretty, but looks aren’t everything. He has beaten the Tour’s biggest names – all by playing his ugly game. Now in Winning Ugly Gilbert teaches recreational players how to win more often without necessarily even changing their strokes. The key to success, he says, is to become a better thinking player – to recognize, analyze and capitalize.
That means outthinking your opponents before, during and much after a match; forcing him or her to play your game. Winning Ugly is an invaluable combat manual for the court, and its tips include some real gems. Ultimately, Winning Ugly will help you beat players who have been beating you. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region.
But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war.
That being the case, U. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo’s ethnic balance by forcing 1. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win.
The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O’Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.
When was the last time you won a perfect game? Every chess player knows that smooth wins are the exception, that play is often chaotic and positions are frequently irrational. The road to victory is generally full of bumps and misadventures. Welcome to the world of imperfection! Chess books usually feature superbly played games. Even when it finally did, it failed to develop a reliable strategy for establishing such a protectorate-like arrangement in Kosovo.
It had a hope, but not a plan. Even if the war itself was not easily or demonstrably avoidable, NATO leaders should have been better prepared. That required knowing what the objective was and then committing to achieve it with the necessary military might.
Instead NATO went to war in the hope it could win without much of a fight. It was proven wrong. The U. The United States did not even envisage hard-hitting attacks during that short period: on March 24 it had made available only about one-third the number of aircraft it ultimately devoted to the war, and days earlier it had pulled its only nearby aircraft carrier out of the Mediterranean region and thus away from the war zone.
Air Force doctrine that requires that air supremacy be established in the early phase of any war. In short, the frequent postwar tendencies of Clinton administration officials, particularly at the Pentagon, to blame the allies for the slow start of Operation Allied Force is almost entirely without foundation.
As a result of that blindness, the alliance was caught entirely unprepared for what followed. Had NATO not enjoyed such a huge military advantage over Serbia, the alliance might well have lost its first real war. Finally, had Milosevic not upped the stakes in the conflict by drastically escalating his forced expulsion campaign, NATO could easily have lost the war. He so repulsed Western publics with his barbaric actions that the alliance found a resolve it would almost certainly not have otherwise displayed.
If Milosevic had hunkered down and restrained his military and paramilitary forces during the bombing, support within NATO countries for sustaining the operation probably would have quickly dissipated.
In a way that alliance leaders did not anticipate, he shored up their resolve and cohesion by his brutal treatment of the ethnic Albanians. Without it, NATO would probably have bombed for a few days and then been obliged to desist, even had Milosevic continued to resist an international armed presence in Kosovo.
True, Milosevic would have had to expect stronger economic sanctions in the aftermath of such an unsuccessful bombing campaign, but he had proven he could live with that. That he did not adopt such an approach may have been his greatest mistake of the war. Since the day the war ended U. However, making war by accepting political constraints that impede sound military preparations can be a prescription for defeat—and nearly was in this case. It is true that NATO is, and must be, a committee.
Before the war, the proper approach would have been a muscular NATO threat to Milosevic, with the goal of convincing him to allow the establishment of a de facto international protectorate over Kosovo that would ensure the safety of civilians and demilitarize the KLA. Either in the fall of or in the immediate aftermath of the January Racak massacres, NATO should have promised a much more extensive and openended bombing campaign.
Ideally it should also have deployed forces into the region to conduct a ground invasion if necessary. This approach might have produced a negotiated settlement allowing international peacekeeping troops into the province. If not, once it began bombing NATO would have had the option of intervening quickly had massive slaughters been undertaken by the Serbs or if a lack of food supplies had led to widespread starvation.
That it would have been extremely hard for the Clinton administration to convince Congress and the NATO allies to support such a strategy and that there was no guarantee that such a threat would then have worked, we acknowledge. But there is no excuse for not trying. And it should never have ruled a ground force option off the table. The ethnic Albanian people of Kosovo, who suffered significant oppression under Slobodan Milosevic, are today far better off than they would have been had NATO stood aside.
Their violent reprisal against Serbs in Kosovo since the war ended, while highly regrettable, does not begin to compare to what had happened before. Moreover, NATO as an alliance distinguished itself by showing the political will to do what was right, on humanitarian and political grounds, even in the face of strident opposition from Moscow and Beijing.
It is a critique and, in places, a rather severe one. NATO in general, and the Clinton administration in particular, missed key opportunities in and early to reduce the odds of war. The alliance then undertook armed hostilities when it was unprepared for real combat, unwisely confident that its short campaign of coercive bombing would work. Its poor preparation and early lack of resolve extended the conflict; luckily that did not exact an enormous price in civilian or military lives lost, but it was risky—and unnecessary.
But the post—cold war world has already seen major Western military interventions designed to save lives or uphold democratic principles in Panama, northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor.
This war will not be the last time that NATO governments use force to save lives. From the moment violence exploded, the battle lines were drawn. The United States and European countries had long been concerned about Kosovo and the consequences of a violent eruption in the area.
Once the Serb assault commenced in early March , however, international attention was immediate and involved the highest levels of the U. Throughout much of , however, U. The desire to halt an escalation in the fighting and to forge a political solution did not, at least initially, extend to a willingness to consider a forceful intervention to bring these results about. Rather than exposing themselves to the inevitable risks that any military option entailed, the Clinton administration and its European allies were content to defer for as long as possible having to make a choice among the unpalatable options of letting the Serbs get away with their murderous campaign against the KLA, supporting ethnic Albanian aspirations for independence, and taking the decisive action necessary to avoid either of these two outcomes.
And once they were prepared to threaten force, they did so only tentatively and irresolutely. However, key details of the HolbrookeMilosevic agreement remained ill defined, and whatever NATO commitment existed to enforce compliance with its terms was effectively nullified by the decision to deploy unarmed monitors to the region.
Consistent with U. Within days of the Serb crackdown that left eighty-five people dead, foreign ministers from the six countries met in London to condemn the attack and take stock. The ministers demanded that Milosevic agree to cease all action by Serb security forces against the civilian population, withdraw Serb special police units from the territory within ten days, allow humanitarian groups to enter Kosovo, and commence an unconditional dialogue with the Albanian community.
Failure to meet these demands, the ministers warned, would lead to imposition of an arms embargo, a denial of travel visas for senior Yugoslav and Serb officials, a moratorium on export credits for trade and investment, and a freeze on funds held abroad. This prompt, high-level, and unified response to the eruption of violence in Kosovo reflected a number of assumptions the six Contact Group countries had derived from their shared experience in dealing with the Bosnian conflict earlier in the decade.
First, all agreed that they had to act rapidly in order to avoid a repeat of the Bosnian horrors. Both had been absent in Bosnia. In that case, U. From day one, Albright forcefully took the lead in devising an appropriate response to the violence.
Aside from a strong response, her goal was to ensure allied unity rather than division and to forge a path that would keep the Russians on board. This explains why the six-nation Contact Group, which had been founded to minimize disagreements over Bosnia, was chosen as the vehicle for developing a common approach to Kosovo. A third assumption of Western policy was that only concerted pressure on Milosevic would prove effective in convincing Belgrade to end the violence and commence a dialogue with the Albanian community in Kosovo.
A policy of carrots had failed. In November , Milosevic spurned a European Union offer to improve diplomatic and trade relations with Belgrade and support its reentry into international institutions in return for accepting a negotiating process between the Kosovar, Serb, and Yugoslav authorities that would be supported by third-party mediation. Independence posed two major problems. First, it could destabilize the rest of the region.
The fragile interethnic consensus in Macedonia would be severely shaken, providing the minority Albanian population there with an incentive to join their Kosovar and Albanian neighbors in the quest for a Greater Albania.
A second concern fueling opposition to independence was that independence in Kosovo would set a precedent for Bosnia, where Bosnian Serb and Croat claims for independence—or for merger with neighboring states—were at least as strong as those of the Kosovar Albanians.
Although these four assumptions of Western policy toward Kosovo were widely shared, they contained at least three contradictions. First, there was a conflict between the desire to act quickly and decisively, and the perceived need to forge a consensus on policy not only with key NATO allies but also with Russia. Given the range of views within the Contact Group on how to respond to the crisis—with the Russians and, to some extent, the Italians, favoring a policy of relying on positive incentives and the Americans and British preferring a more confrontational policy—forging a consensus on decisive action proved difficult.
At times, however, this conflict was bypassed when the need for action outweighed getting the agreement of all Contact Group members, as when Russia abstained from decisions to impose economic sanctions on Belgrade and when NATO, in threatening to use force, bypassed the UN Security Council and a certain Russian veto. A second contradiction concerned the belief that a solution to the Kosovo crisis lay in pressing Milosevic to end the violent crackdown in Kosovo— while at the same time NATO relied on him to negotiate a final settlement with the Albanian community.
This meant that the ability to apply pressure on Milosevic to end the violence would at every turn be constrained by the realization that in the end the Yugoslav president was central to any successful negotiations. It was therefore never really apparent who had leverage over whom: the United States and its allies over Milosevic, or vice versa.
A third contradiction was pressuring Milosevic to end the violence while hoping not to encourage the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to push their maximalist claims for independence. Having rejected independence as an acceptable outcome of the conflict, Western policymakers had to constantly balance their pressure against Belgrade with the need to discourage the Kosovars from pressing their case for secession.
These policy contradictions were not inevitable. For example, the decision to rely on consensus within the Contact Group inevitably resulted in least-common-denominator policies, hardly the kind of approach necessary to convince Belgrade to change course.
None of these options would have ensured success, but all would have improved the prospects for a peaceful settlement. Rather than making these choices, however, the United States and its European partners sought to defer making difficult decisions, preferring instead to muddle through in the hope that somehow and someway a solution would present itself that would at once end the violence, provide a firm political basis for a settlement, and avoid confronting the international community with the need to use massive force.
Responding to Violence By early , there were indications that the low-level violence that had beset Kosovo the previous year would escalate into a major conflagration.
The Central Intelligence Agency warned in mid-January that the Serb authorities were contemplating a crackdown on ethnic Albanians. A month later it warned senior U. Days later a major assault on Srbica and other villages in the Drenica valley left another fifty-one people dead, including a KLA leader, Adem Jashari, and twenty members of his family. Those killed included at least eleven children and twenty-three women.
Within a week, eighty-five people were murdered by Serb security forces. Her main purpose was to push the European allies, American public opinion, and even her own government toward concerted action designed to avert the kind of human tragedy that had happened in Bosnia. Her leverage was neither a plan of action nor a U. Each small act of aggression that we did not oppose led to larger acts of aggression that we could not oppose without great risk to ourselves.
Only when those responsible paid for their actions with isolation and hardship did the war end. It took us seven years to bring Bosnia to this moment of hope.
It must not take us that long to resolve the crisis that is growing in Kosovo; and it does not have to if we apply the lessons of This time, we must act with unity and resolve. This time, we must respond before it is too late. To back up their demands, five of the six Contact Group nations agreed to consider additional measures, including instituting a complete arms embargo, denying visas to senior Serb government and security officials, placing a halt on export credit financing, and freezing Serb-held funds abroad.
This absence was the more notable since both the Bush and the Clinton administrations had warned Milosevic in and that the U. Yet although senior Clinton administration officials never ruled out using force and insisted that all options were open, no one repeated this so-called Christmas warning, and any question about whether the warning was still in effect was consistently deflected.
There were at least two reasons that the United States did not push the issue of threatening the use of force. First, there was very little appetite in Washington for another potential military adventure at this particular time. Berger summarily and angrily rejected the idea, noting that NATO had not even begun drawing up plans and that no one had yet thought through what might happen if air strikes did not have their intended effect.
Berger had long believed that the Christmas warning, a threat of unilateral American military action, had been overtaken by events. The large presence of NATO—primarily European—troops in neighboring Bosnia only added to the conviction that military action would have to involve allied consent. One U. Allies do not do that to each other.
A commitment to ensure the security of the local population if necessary, by deploying a NATO military presence might have convinced the ethnic Albanians to abandon the armed struggle and settle for at least an interim period of autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
They were even less inclined in this direction and at least as worried about inadvertently supporting the KLA as was Washington. Yet during these initial months of the conflict the Clinton administration never tried to reach a NATO consensus on the issue, not only because it thought the allies politically might not go along but also, and more important, because it was worried that the use of force was not sustainable at home.
Enter NATO Even though the United States and its NATO allies ruled out threatening or using force in the initial months of the conflict, the allies were determined to ensure that, unlike in Bosnia, this time the alliance would be involved from the beginning.
Let me stress, nothing is excluded. However, did this mean that NATO was prepared to drop the missiles and bombs slung under the wings of their aircraft on Serb targets? Or was the exercise more a demonstration of how little the allies were in fact prepared to do to forcefully end the fighting in Kosovo?
What we now have to focus on in order to support the ongoing political process is to elaborate credible military options aiming at the core of the problem: the extensive use of violence by Serb security or military forces against the Albanian population in Kosovo.
Two sets of options were examined—preventive deployments and intrusive measures—and the entire panoply was briefed to the North Atlantic Council in July and August These options required the deployment of between 7, and 23, troops.
NATO military authorities also prepared a set of intrusive measures, including a phased air campaign and a full range of options for using ground forces. Unlike the bombing operation in Bosnia, the air campaign would involve a major attack to destroy the extensive Serb air defense network, which included some sixty fixed surface-to-air missile sites and combat aircraft.
As for ground forces, four options were developed, two for deploying troops in Kosovo with the consent of the parties to the conflict options A and A— and two for a forced entry into the area options B and B—. The last two options would have been linked to a phased air campaign. There was very little interest within the NAC in the forced entry options options B and B— , which were subsequently shelved though not discarded.
Three obstacles to developing an allied consensus emerged. Second, even among those who supported intervention in principle, there was disagreement on how to do so most effectively and with least risk. At the same time, an increasingly large, active, well-armed, and even brazen KLA was taking advantage of relative Serb passivity, seizing control of large swaths of territory, especially in rural areas.
Its ranks had swollen to many thousands, with new recruits joining even from the extensive Albanian diaspora. And for many months, I made the statement that we will not be the air force for the KLA. Speaking at a background briefing, one U. The situation is fluid. But the alternative of relying on airpower also had its detractors.
That left strikes by manned aircraft. To be effective and minimize risks, an attack would have to begin by taking out Serb air defenses. Few NATO members were at this point prepared to threaten, let alone launch, what would amount to a smaller-scale version of the air war phase of Desert Storm. Even if the allies had been able to agree on how they might threaten to intervene, however, they were deeply divided over the legal mandate for such action. As a defensive military alliance, NATO had traditionally considered using force only if one or more of its members were attacked, a right enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The case of Kosovo was different. Not only did NATO members agree that Kosovo was an integral part of Yugoslavia and, indeed, should remain so, but they were considering threatening or using force against a sovereign country in order to persuade the Belgrade government to cease violent attacks against its Albanian population. This was not, therefore, a question of self-defense. Accordingly, under one interpretation of international law, the alliance could use force in this instance only with the explicit authorization of the UN Security Council.
However, this view, which was strongly argued by France and Germany and supported by Britain and most other European governments, posed a dilemma for NATO. For Russia had made clear that it would veto any resolution authorizing the use of force against Serbia in Kosovo, a position also held by China.
To prevent a possible veto of NATO action by Russia, the United States maintained that it should be possible to threaten or use force without explicit UN authorization. Encouraging a Political Solution The main purpose of exerting pressure on the Milosevic regime, aside from forcing an end to the violence, was to encourage a political solution to the Kosovo problem. However, the search for such a solution faced at least three major obstacles. First, the differences among the parties over what constituted an acceptable solution were wide and growing.
Second, because Belgrade regarded the conflict as strictly an internal matter, it rejected outright any suggestion of an international role in the search for a possible resolution. Having learned a lesson from Bosnia, Washington decided early on that it would have to take the lead in trying to overcome these obstacles. The most basic and, at the same time, most important obstacle to reaching a political solution in Kosovo was the difference in views on how the conflict might be resolved.
To Belgrade, which in had stripped Kosovo of its constitutional autonomy and instituted a repressive form of rule, the issue was simple. The central authority had every right, even the duty, to suppress the rebellion and eliminate the terrorists.
There was therefore no question of giving up Kosovo in any political sense—and certainly not in response to terrorist actions. Not surprisingly, the Albanian population of Kosovo viewed matters quite differently. Despite that, the majority population had been stripped of its autonomy in and had borne the brunt of Serb repression during the subsequent nine years.
Hundreds would be killed and hundreds of thousands expelled from their homes, many of which were subsequently burned to the ground.
Under these circumstances, the thought of restoring the autonomy Kosovo had enjoyed before was regarded by all Kosovar Albanians as insufficient.
This was the demand not only of the KLA some of whose supporters championed independence as a first step toward establishing a greater Albania, which would comprise Kosovo, Albania, and the Albanian-populated areas of Macedonia and even of Greece but also of the more moderate political leadership associated with Ibrahim Rugova.
To jump-start the process, Washington sent Richard Holbrooke to the area. A seasoned diplomat with extensive experience in the region, Holbrooke had successfully negotiated a Bosnian peace agreement with Milosevic in As a result of that earlier triumph, Holbrooke was widely regarded as the one person able to convince Milosevic to reach a political settlement with the Kosovar Albanians.
Although Milosevic had little to lose from meeting with Rugova so long as it remained purely bilateral, Rugova took a risk by meeting with the person who was responsible for indiscriminate attacks against Kosovar civilians. A photograph of his meeting with Milosevic, in which he appeared to be smiling, weakened his standing within Kosovo, especially among hard-liners.
This task fell to Christopher Hill, the U. Hill would spend many months trying to move the sides closer together. Second, Holbrooke convinced Milosevic to accede to the long-standing demand by the Contact Group to allow diplomatic observers to travel from Belgrade to Kosovo to take stock of the situation on the ground. This agreement laid the basis for establishing the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission KDOM , which by summer evolved into a permanent foreign monitoring presence in the area.
Hill also faced fundamental differences among the Albanians about who should constitute a negotiating team. The KLA was divided even on the question of whether there could be any negotiations at all; its only point of agreement was to reject Rugova as the sole interlocutor. Through the summer, Hill strove valiantly to put a Kosovar negotiating team together. In late June Washington abandoned its resistance to including the KLA in a negotiating effort, recognizing that its participation would be necessary to make any deal stick.
Both Holbrooke and Gelbard met with KLA leaders publicly and privately to convince them to participate. Moreover, the United States and its European allies were bound to oppose any movement in this direction for fear of the precedent it would set in Bosnia, the formal partition of which had been avoided at Dayton. That left autonomy as the least-worse option, but this concept offered no real solution either, for the Serbs and Albanians remained far apart on the extent and nature of autonomy.
Instead of focusing on direct talks, the six nations agreed in July to draw up a plan for autonomy in Kosovo that could provide the basis for discussions between the parties and, eventually, agreement by them on how to proceed. The offensive was designed to deliver a punishing blow against the KLA, which had exploited the previous period of relative Serb restraint by succeeding in taking control of a substantial part of Kosovo. However, during this offensive, Serb military, paramilitary, and interior police forces left little unscathed.
In August alone, , Kosovars were forced to flee their homes see figure Although many found shelter with family and friends, mostly in urban areas, about one-third of those left homeless did not, taking refuge instead in the forests and mountains surrounding their villages and homes. Quite apart from the sheer brutality of Serb actions, the international community was now confronted with a potential humanitarian crisis on a vast scale.
While people could live outside during the summer and early fall, winter arrives early in this mountainous territory.
Snow could fall as early as mid-October, threatening the many tens of thousands of people exposed to the elements with starvation and the possibility of literally freezing to death. This prospect finally concentrated minds in Washington and elsewhere. The fighting had to end; Serb military and police forces had to withdraw; international relief agencies had to enter to assist those displaced from their homes, and a real political dialogue had to begin without preconditions and with international involvement.
It would take more than a month of tough negotiations for the UN Security Council to pass a resolution to formally make these demands of the Yugoslav authorities. Still missing was a consensus even within and between NATO governments on what they were prepared to do. This was not for lack of military planning. They ensure that NATO can act swiftly and effectively should the need arise. The ground options were notional plans for enforcing a peace settlement or a cease-fire agreement as well as for a ground invasion of Kosovo and Yugoslavia in conjunction with an air campaign.
The case for such action was forcefully made during an informal NATO defense ministerial meeting in Portugal on September 23—24, Serb actions were not only beyond the pale but actually mocked the allies by keeping the offensive at a level that Belgrade believed would prevent a NATO decision to use force.
They must go forward with this, or it will be seen as simply a hollow warning. It did not amount to a decision to use force, or even to threaten it explicitly, but rather enabled the alliance to prepare for such a decision in short order. It is not a decision to use force, but it is a sign of recognition by the Alliance and all of its members of the increasing seriousness and urgency of the situation.
It will allow the Alliance to move within a matter of days from a situation of being ready to execute. The massacre in Gornji Obrinje was particularly brutal, involving twenty-one women, children, and the elderly, ranging in age from four to ninety-five; in a neighboring village thirteen more were killed.
Among those slaughtered was a woman, seven months pregnant, whose stomach had been slit open. Even though the allies had debated the mandate question for many months, by early October they were no closer to a resolution than they had been at the start. For that reason, China had failed to support Resolution , believing it went too far, and Russia had conditioned its approval of Resolution on the understanding that it not authorize the threat or use of force. With Security Council action blocked by the certainty of Russian and Chinese vetoes, achieving agreement as to what the legal justification for threatening or using force would be was no easy matter.
Yet other governments maintained that the human rights rules and norms adopted by the OSCE over the years, especially those regarding minority rights, suggested that a particularly high standard could be applied to the behavior of European states.
In this particular case, we have a resolution which does open the way to the possibility of military action. I would add, and repeat, that the humanitarian situation constitutes a ground that can justify an exception to a rule, however strong and firm it is. What started out as a largely theological debate ended up dividing NATO into three camps. Solana did so admirably when, on October 10, after some ten hours of debate on the issue in the North Atlantic Council, he summed up by stating that there was sufficient legal basis for moving forward with issuing a specific threat of force and, if necessary, proceeding with its implementation.
Solana deliberately left unstated what constituted the exact basis of this judgment, knowing that while there was agreement on the former, the debate had demonstrated its absence on the latter.
As reiterated by the Contact Group on October 8, these demands included: —an end to offensive operations and hostilities; —the withdrawal of Serb security forces to their positions before March and the withdrawal of heavy weapons; —freedom of access for humanitarian agencies; —full cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal to ensure that those who committed atrocities are brought to justice; —the facilitation of the return of refugees to their homes without fear; —a start to negotiations on the basis of proposals drafted by Christopher Hill after extensive consultations with both sides.
One related to the deployment of a large civilian presence, composed of retired and active duty military personnel and diplomats operating under the auspices of the OSCE, that would supplant the monitors of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, which had operated in the area since July. Holbrooke initially proposed deploying 3,—4, unarmed observers, while Milosevic suggested the total be limited to 25— The other proposed mechanism consisted of aerial surveillance conducted by unarmed NATO reconnaissance planes over the Kosovo territory.
Their purpose would be to ascertain that Serb military and security forces had been withdrawn to agreed levels and that the remainder were confined to agreed areas.
Although the Yugoslav military regarded such surveillance as an intrusion upon Serb sovereignty, Milosevic did not dismiss the idea out of hand.
After months of shuttling between the two sides, Christopher Hill who had accompanied Holbrooke to Belgrade had a good sense of where the difficulties in any negotiation now lay. He and his small staff of State Department lawyers had shared with both sides multiple versions of an interim agreement that would grant Kosovo wide-ranging autonomy while postponing a final decision on its political status for three to five years.
During negotiations that eventually stretched into nine long days of talks, many central aspects of an interim settlement were broached, including the timing and purpose of holding elections, the composition of a local Kosovo police force, and the extent of autonomy granted to local governing institutions in Kosovo and the communes within that territory. After all, one of the two sides concerned was not directly involved in the talks although discussions with the Kosovar Albanians, including by Holbrooke in person, were ongoing during this time.
The goal was less ambitious: to narrow the differences between the sides and to establish a framework and timetable for commencing a direct dialogue that would be supported by international involvement. Despite repeated threats and intimations that NATO was prepared to use force, the alliance had not formally moved to decide the question while talks proceeded in Belgrade. A statement that is theirs and theirs alone. All air defense systems except early-warning radars would have to be removed from the area or placed in cantonment sites to ensure they would not operate for the duration of the mission.
The task of the Kosovo Verification Mission KVM was to verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UN Resolution , to establish a permanent presence throughout Kosovo, and to supervise elections which Belgrade promised could be held within nine months. The humanitarian emergency that finally galvanized NATO to threaten air strikes did ease in the immediate aftermath of the Holbrooke-Milosevic negotiations.
Humanitarian agencies and other international organizations were granted access to the area to assist displaced persons to return home or to find shelter.
The initial deployment of several hundred KVM personnel also contributed to a sense of security, enabling those who had fled to come down from the mountains. By the end of November, all displaced persons inside Kosovo had either returned to their villages or had found temporary shelter elsewhere. This was no mean achievement. That said, the sequence of events does raise an important question: Aside from improving the humanitarian situation for the duration of the winter, what other benefits resulted from the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement?
The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement fell short in at least three respects. Second, although the verification system set up in Kosovo was able to monitor Serb compliance, it was incapable of enforcing it.
Third, in ignoring the Albanian side of the equation, the agreement offered no effective way to prevent the Kosovar Albanians from attempting to exploit the opening created by the retreat of Serb forces. Thus not only was there no way to punish Serb noncompliance, there was also no way to prevent the KLA from exploiting Serb compliance and provoking a possibly violent Serb retort. In this way, the agreement may have contained within it the seeds of its own demise.
The Ambiguity of the Agreement One major flaw in the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement was substantial ambiguity about what exactly the monitors on the ground and in the air were supposed to verify. As previous experience with arms control agreements has demonstrated, any ambiguity about what needs to be verified is cause for trouble.
Would an attack against the KLA forces—either preemptively or in retaliation—constitute a violation? The answer, as subsequent experience was to show, was not clear. But how many interior police and army units could stay in Kosovo and how was their future disposition and use to be limited?
Never codified in writing, the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement was silent on this question. We need to get forces that have been introduced into the area leaving; other forces, basically, that are in garrison or in other non-threatening situations; less roadblocks; less of police presence. This is an overall picture that we want to see on which the situation is less intimidating, less repressive, less violent, so that people can get back to their homes and a negotiating process can begin.
In his talks with Holbrooke, Milosevic agreed to withdraw forces that had been deployed to the province since the outbreak of hostilities earlier that year and to keep those forces remaining in Kosovo in barracks and other peacetime deployment areas including along the border with Albania. However, Holbrooke had left the specific details for NATO officials to negotiate, both because NATO would be responsible for verifying the withdrawal and because it would underscore that this was an alliance agreement, rather than a U.
The total included 4,—5, regular army troops and 3,—4, Interior Ministry police personnel. According to that agreement, the Serb army presence in Kosovo was to be limited to 12, troops. Of these, 1, troops could continue to augment the border guards.
With the exception of three company-sized units deployed to protect critical lines of communication, the remaining army troops would have to return to their barracks and remain there. In addition, Serb Interior Ministry police units were to be limited to 11, personnel, which were to be stationed in twenty-seven sites around the territory.
Most army troops had withdrawn by this date, although the largest unit to leave the th Armored Brigade did not actually return to its barracks in Nis. Moreover, more than 4, Interior Ministry police personnel departed only in the twenty-four hours preceding the midnight deadline. The Absence of Enforcement The second problem with the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, however, was precisely its lack of a credible means of enforcement. This absence was the result of two decisions.
First, Washington decided that there could be no NATO troops on the ground, even if their deployment would be part of any agreement that was to be negotiated. At no time in did it give serious consideration to this option, fearing that it was bound to be rejected by the Congress at home and by the allies abroad.
As early as July, U. It was a complete eye-roller. If I had come to you at that time and requested authorization to put a ground force in—U. And No. How many? How long? How much? And that would have been the extent of the debate and probably would have received an overwhelming rejection from the committee.
First, the implication that a decision to deploy ground forces in the region would have involved the United States acting on its own is wrong. In early August, the British government concluded not only that any solution to the crisis in Kosovo would involve the threat and likely use of military force, but also that ground forces would have to be deployed in Kosovo—if not to end the violence then to enforce the terms of any agreement that was reached.
The cabinet also agreed that Britain would play a leading role in any military action and that London would therefore be prepared to deploy ground forces in large numbers. Indeed, there was some expectation at NATO headquarters in Brussels that Holbrooke would return from Belgrade with precisely such a plan to deploy ground forces.
The logic of deploying an armed presence in Kosovo had been spelled out by Alexander Vershbow, the U. It worked then, Vershbow argued, and if tailored to the circumstances in Kosovo, it could work once again. Specifically, Vershbow proposed creating an international protectorate in Kosovo so as to bypass the question of its political future.
The protectorate would be policed by outside forces provided by NATO. But that decision belonged to Washington, not the allies. The issue was not one of congressional authorization but of making a case that Congress could support, at least in terms of providing funds for the operation.
But not only did the administration fail to make a case for deploying ground forces, it in fact argued against such a deployment. Before briefing Congress in early October on what NATO air strikes might encompass, Cohen made clear that he would not even raise the question of ground forces.
Indeed, one would have hoped that these questions would have been asked and answered by the administration before going to the Hill to ask Congress for its support. In short, it was the Clinton administration that ruled out the use of ground forces. The administration rejected their deployment in Kosovo out of hand in the summer of and did not reconsider this decision until January Although it is likely that Congress, already uneasy about the lengthy deployment of U. Further, our interviews with NATO and allied officials suggest that key allies including France and Germany might well have been prepared to send troops to help implement and enforce any agreement Holbrooke could reach in his talks with Milosevic.
None of the NATO countries was consulted on this suggestion; even the OSCE, under whose auspices the observers would operate, was not informed of the idea of deploying unarmed observers until late on October The United States did not, apparently fearing congressional opposition to any new potential combat role in the region.
There was, however, an inherent contradiction in the deployment of unarmed civilians to verify compliance with the agreement that Holbrooke and Milosevic had negotiated. The main reason for their presence was the oft-repeated insistence that Milosevic could not be trusted.
However, when critics of the agreement noted that unarmed observers were vulnerable to intimidation, and even hostage taking, administration officials claimed not to worry, believing Milosevic would do them no harm. Their best security is unambiguous orders from both sides—the KLA and the Serb forces—not to harm them. And he has kept his word on that.
He has signed a similar pledge with respect to the OSCE. This was a problem common to arms control also: tens of thousands of hours were spent constructing elaborate verification systems, but very little attention was paid to determining what to do in case the system detected noncompliance.
The failure to push for ground forces was one indication that NATO had limited interest in ensuring that Milosevic complied. The decision to use unarmed civilians deprived the allies of the ability to employ airpower effectively; before NATO could act, the safety of the OSCE personnel would have to be guaranteed, thus warning Serbia of the impending action.
Ignoring the KLA The absence of a robust enforcement regime magnified the third major shortcoming of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement: the exclusion of the KLA and other Kosovars from the arrangement.
But other than report what was occurring which the civilian monitors did within days of the agreement , there was little the Kosovo Verification Mission or the NATO aerial verification regime could do to prevent this from happening.
It is a missing element in our overall strategy. When the KLA did act as Milosevic had expected, there was a price to be paid, one the Yugoslav president had hinted at in a chilling conversation with Generals Clark and Naumann in late October.
We asked what the solution was. We killed them all. It took several years, but eventually we killed them all. And we had no problem. In short, Operation Horseshoe was an audacious plan. Only its authors and those who ultimately approved its implementation can be held responsible for the evil that the operation represented.
It was neither a necessary nor even a logical outcome of the agreement that Holbrooke and Milosevic had negotiated, and it would be wrong to suggest otherwise. But there was also nothing in the October agreement that could have prevented this turn of events. The ability to enforce its terms was effectively neutralized by the presence of less than 2, unarmed observers, each one a potential hostage. Little thought had been given to how the KLA could be prevented from taking advantage of the changing balance of forces that resulted from the departure of some Serb security personnel.
In other words, the agreement did nothing to prevent a return to fighting or to halt an escalation in violence, even though it was almost certain that both would soon occur.
Peace at a Price The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement did buy time—time that may well have proven important to get 50, people through the winter without exposing them to freezing temperatures and the risks of starvation. First, in focusing on resolving the immediate humanitarian crisis, those negotiating the accord appear to have ignored the fact that any outside intervention in conflicts has political consequences, even interventions undertaken solely for humanitarian purposes.
Second, since the agreement offered no solution to the underlying reasons for the conflict, it was evident that it could not hold past winter, if that. Like any intervention in internal conflicts, humanitarian interventions have political consequences. In a conflict pitting two or more sides against each other, there can generally be no truly impartial intervention.
It should have been evident in the Kosovo case as well. That, combined with the international presence in the region, worked to reassure the displaced Albanian population to come down from the hills and seek shelter for the winter, thus averting a potentially catastrophic humanitarian disaster. The short-term humanitarian success must therefore be weighed against the longer term impact of ignoring the political consequences of achieving that success.
It was evident from the start that the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement represented only a short-term palliative, and Holbrooke and Hill repeatedly warned Washington of this fact after negotiations ended.
If even more destructive fighting is not to occur we must turn off the engines driving this conflict. The unenviable task of finding a political solution in the few weeks before the conflict would again heat up was handed to Christopher Hill, who Milosevic had agreed could work as a mediator between the two sides as long as a face-to-face dialogue would not be convened. For lack of a better alternative, the Clinton administration and its European allies seized upon a set of perceived Serb concessions that had been worked out by Hill during the Holbrooke-Milosevic negotiations in Belgrade.
Working feverishly, along with a small team of State Department lawyers, Hill sought to close the gap between the two sides. However, each time the draft interim agreement was adjusted to reflect the concerns of one side, the other side would raise new objections.
The task of reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable proved to be frustrating and ultimately impossible. As one discouraged U. Think of the Mideast. Think of Northern Ireland. Forget Bosnia. Not surprisingly, therefore, violence soon reemerged in Kosovo. The occasional skirmishes that accompanied KLA advances on the heels of retreating Serb forces soon escalated into regular and increasingly intense confrontations.
As violence mounted, Serb army forces moved out of their garrisons without prior notification and Interior Ministry units that were required to withdraw from Kosovo soon returned to join in the fray.
If the two sides are unwilling to live up to their agreements, 2,, 3,, or 4, unarmed verifiers cannot frustrate their attempts to go after each other. In the short term, the agreement helped to forestall a major humanitarian crisis.
In the long term, however, the deal resolved nothing. It was therefore incumbent upon NATO leaders to prepare for its inevitable breakdown. This they did not do, in part because U. As a result, Washington and allied capitals were caught largely unprepared when violence once again erupted in full force early in the new year.
And their weak responses to early violations of the agreement told Milosevic that he might be able to get away with such violence, even on a massive scale. Army artillery had pounded the village for three days before Serb forces entered. When they left, at least forty-five people had been slaughtered, including three women, a twelve-year-old boy, and several elderly men. All had been executed. One person had been decapitated. They entered Racak within twenty-four hours of the killing and described a scene of unspeakable horror.
Surveying the sight, Ambassador William Walker, a seasoned American diplomat who had witnessed his share of atrocities while serving in Central America and who now headed the KVM, described what he had seen: O I talked to several villagers.
In a gully above the village, I saw the first body. It was covered with a blanket, and when it was pulled back, I saw there was no head on the corpse—just an incredibly bloody mess on the neck.
Somebody told me that the skull was on the other side of the gully and asked if I wanted to see that. They had wounds on their heads, and there was blood on their clothes. A couple had what appeared to be bullet wounds knocking out their eyes. I was told there were other bodies further up and over the crest of the hill, and I was asked by journalists and inspectors if I was going to go up and see the rest.
They had looked to the agreement worked out between Richard Holbrooke and Slobodan Milosevic the previous October as a vehicle to buy time to reach a political settlement before the resumption of the fighting that was expected in April. The much-touted deployments of the OSCE verification mission and NATO aerial surveillance, while able to monitor developments, could not prevent violations of the agreement or enforce its implementation.
Notwithstanding the efforts by Christopher Hill in leading a negotiating shuttle, it was evident that the Serb and Kosovar Albanian sides were no closer to reaching a political solution than they had been in mid when the diplomatic effort began. After the massacre it was obvious to everyone within the Clinton administration that a new policy was needed, one that stressed decisive action; they abandoned the wait-and-see attitude that characterized U.
Yet a decision to use military force of any kind—from the air, on the ground, or both—still faced considerable obstacles. First, no one had made the case to the U. Congress or the public for large-scale use of military force in Kosovo. Instead, the October agreement had been hailed as a major achievement of American diplomacy backed by the threat of NATO force, and the Racak massacre was the first widely publicized indication that the situation on the ground was deteriorating.
It would take time to make the case to the public for decisive military action. Second, with few exceptions, the NATO allies were not prepared to take military action, as became clear when the North Atlantic Council met two days after the massacre.
It was evident that some form of diplomatic activity would have to take place before all the allies would accept the need for stronger measures. Third, there was extreme reluctance on the part of the Clinton administration to consider the use of military force—even if it was limited to air strikes. Some officials feared an antiseptic, limited use of airpower, which they sensed might fail.
Most officials were also concerned about the political impact of a decision to use force in an atmosphere poisoned by the impeachment procedures that were then ongoing. With the House having voted to impeach the president and the Senate in the midst of deciding on his possible removal from office, this was hardly a propitious time to lead NATO into war.
Finally, there was a widespread belief within the Clinton administration and among the NATO allies and authorities that decisive military action was not required. Instead, many believed that a credible threat of force—and possibly its demonstrative use—would suffice to convince Milosevic that NATO was serious and push him to make a political deal granting the Kosovar Albanians far-reaching autonomy. Equally important was the assumption of U. Given these considerations, the U.
That effort took place at a medieval castle in the French village of Rambouillet, located just outside Paris.
The talks at Rambouillet proved to be a disappointment. No agreement was reached between the parties, and even the Kosovars left the castle with only a commitment in principle to sign the accords at a future date which they subsequently did. The failure of the Rambouillet talks left the United States and NATO with little choice but to follow through on their frequent threats of force and commence military operations against Serbia. Instead, Milosevic escalated the conflict, forcing well over a million ethnic Albanians from their homes, and NATO ultimately had to fly one-third as many sorties as in the Desert Storm operation to prevail.
Could a different diplomatic strategy have succeeded where the Rambouillet talks failed? Was it necessary for the United States and NATO to use force once it became clear that neither the Serbs nor the Kosovar Albanians were interested in settling their differences peacefully? War may not have been inevitable in early However, only the most Herculean of strategies which virtually no one in any NATO country, inside or outside government, proposed might have prevented war by this late date.
At least in theory, there were two alternatives to the approach taken at Rambouillet, one diplomatic, the other military. On the diplomatic front, the Clinton administration and its Contact Group allies could have approached the negotiations differently.
For example, the Contact Group could have proposed partitioning Kosovo into Serb and ethnic Albanian regions. And while both parties naturally insisted that they control the entire territory, partition offered a possible compromise—which voices in Serbia had raised in the past.
Although it is impossible to know for certain, the answer is almost certainly no. There is no indication that Belgrade ever seriously contemplated a division of Kosovo; its political and military aim was to retain and strengthen its control over the territory by destroying the Kosovar rebel force and, if necessary, to forcefully change the internal ethnic balance.
In other words, a partition proposal would not have changed the basic nature of the problem, since Serbia would likely have opposed it even more strongly than it opposed the Rambouillet approach. Negotiators could have rejected an interim solution and pushed for far-reaching autonomy and selfgovernment as a final solution to the conflict.
Doing so would have avoided the issue of a vote or referendum at the end of the interim period, a possibility that, given the large ethnic Albanian majority, Belgrade naturally found difficult to accept. Yet even if Belgrade would have accepted a substantial degree of autonomy for Kosovo, the Kosovar Albanians would not. The one thing uniting ethnic Albanians across the political spectrum in Kosovo was the preservation of the option for independence.
Even if that obstacle could somehow have been overcome and the presence of the KLA made that exceedingly unlikely , the Kosovars would have insisted on a large international security force to protect them against Serb military and police forces—the one provision of Rambouillet that Belgrade refused even to discuss.
Without such a force, moreover, the KLA could not have been checked, leaving the ingredients in place for a worsening conflict down the road.
[PDF] PDF Winning Ugly de Brad Gilbert Steve Jamison Baixar Livros – Free Download PDF
А что, если этот парень способен ему помочь. – Прошу прощения, – сказал. – Я не расслышал, как тебя зовут. – Двухцветный, – прошипел панк, словно вынося приговор. – Двухцветный? – изумился Беккер.